



SARS- CoV- 2 variants of concern dominate in Lahore, Pakistan in 
April 2021
Muhammad Bilal Sarwar1†, Muhammad Yasir2†, Nabil- Fareed Alikhan2,*, Nadeem Afzal1, Leonardo de Oliveira Martins2, 
Thanh Le Viet2, Alexander J. Trotter2, Sophie J. Prosolek2, Gemma L. Kay2, Ebenezer Foster- Nyarko2, Steven Rudder2, 
David J. Baker2, Sidra Tul Muntaha1,3, Muhammad Roman1, Mark A. Webber2,4, Almina Shafiq1, Bilquis Shabbir5, 
Javed Akram1, Andrew J. Page2 and Shah Jahan1,*
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Sarwar et al., Microbial Genomics 2021;7:000693
DOI 10.1099/mgen.0.000693
Received 09 June 2021; Accepted 14 September 2021; Published 30 November 2021
Author affiliations: 1Department of Immunology, University of Health Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan; 2Quadram Institute Bioscience, Norwich Research 
Park, Norwich, Norfolk, UK; 3Central Diagnostic Facility, Mayo Hospital, Lahore, Pakistan; 4University of East Anglia, Norwich, Norfolk, UK; 5Department 
of Medicine, East Medical Ward, King Edward Medical University Mayo Hospital, Lahore, Pakistan.
*Correspondence: Nabil- Fareed Alikhan,  nabil- fareed. alikhan@ quadram. ac. uk; Shah Jahan,  shahjahan@ uhs. edu. pk
Keywords: ARTIC; genomic epidemiology; genome; NGS; sequencing; SARS- CoV- 2.
Abbreviations: cDNA, complementary DNA; CT, cycle threshold; ENA, European Nucleotide Archive; GISAID, Global Initiative on Sharing Avian 
Influenza Data; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; RNA, Ribonucleic acid; SARS- CoV- 2, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; SNP, Single 
nucleotide polymorphism; UK, United Kingdom; VOCs, variants of concern; VOIs, variants of interest; WHO, World Health Organization.
†These authors contributed equally to this work
Data statement: All supporting data, code and protocols have been provided within the article or through supplementary data files. Four supplementary 
tables and one supplementary figure are available with the online version of this article.
000693 © 2021 The Authors
This is an open- access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License.
Abstract
The SARS- CoV- 2 pandemic continues to expand globally, with case numbers rising in many areas of the world, including the 
Indian sub- continent. Pakistan has one of the world’s largest populations, of over 200 million people and is experiencing a 
severe third wave of infections caused by SARS- CoV- 2 that began in March 2021. In Pakistan, during the third wave until now 
only 12 SARS- CoV- 2 genomes have been collected and among these nine are from Islamabad. This highlights the need for more 
genome sequencing to allow surveillance of variants in circulation. In fact, more genomes are available among travellers with a 
travel history from Pakistan, than from within the country itself. We thus aimed to provide a snapshot assessment of circulating 
lineages in Lahore and surrounding areas with a combined population of 11.1 million. Within a week of April 2021, 102 samples 
were sequenced. The samples were randomly collected from two hospitals with a diagnostic PCR cutoff value of less than 25 
cycles. Analysis of the lineages shows that the Alpha variant of concern (first identified in the UK) dominates, accounting for 
97.9 % (97/99) of cases, with the Beta variant of concern (first identified in South Africa) accounting for 2.0 % (2/99) of cases. 
No other lineages were observed. In depth analysis of the Alpha lineages indicated multiple separate introductions and subse-
quent establishment within the region. Eight samples were identical to genomes observed in Europe (seven UK, one Switzer-
land), indicating recent transmission. Genomes of other samples show evidence that these have evolved, indicating sustained 
transmission over a period of time either within Pakistan or other countries with low- density genome sequencing. Vaccines 
remain effective against Alpha, however, the low level of Beta against which some vaccines are less effective demonstrates the 
requirement for continued prospective genomic surveillance.
DATA SUMMARY
Consensus genomes are available from GISAID (Shu and 
McCauley, 2017) subject to minimum quality control criteria, 
with individual sample accession numbers in Table S1, avail-
able in the online version of this article). Raw reads and 
consensus genomes are available from European Nucleotide 
Archive (ENA) in Bioproject PRJEB45462. Individual sample 
accession numbers for each database are listed in Table S1. 
Anonymized metadata was available to all authors and is 
deposited along with the genomic data in GISAID and the 
ENA and is provided in Table S1. Supplementary Material 
can be found in Figshare: https:// doi. org/ 10. 6084/ m9. figshare. 
16553199. v1 [1].
INTRODUCTION
The COVID- 19 pandemic has spread rapidly throughout the 
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an unknown case of pneumonia in the city of Wuhan, PR China 
[2]. The causative pathogen has since been named ‘severe acute 
respiratory syndrome- related coronavirus 2 (SARS- CoV- 2)’. As 
of May 2021, there have been over 167 million reported cases and 
3.4 million fatalities [3]. Genomic surveillance has assisted the 
pandemic response providing information for outbreak investi-
gations and detecting possible epitope changes that would allow 
the virus to escape vaccines. Multiple classification systems have 
been developed to quickly communicate SARS- CoV- 2 variants 
circulating in a community [4–6]. From these definitions, certain 
lineages have been designated as variants of concern (VOCs), 
which are defined as such due to indications of increased trans-
mission patterns and/or possible resistance to vaccine and/or 
other treatments [7]. The World Health Organisation (WHO) 
has introduced a new nomenclature of these VOCs and variants 
of Interest (VOIs) based on Greek alphabets.
B.1.1.7 (Alpha) and B.1.351 (Beta) are two VOCs that have 
circulated globally. The SARS- CoV- 2 lineage B.1.1.7, desig-
nated variant of concern 202012/01 (VOC) by Public Health 
England, was first identified in the UK in late Summer to early 
Autumn 2020 [7]. B.1.351 is another VOC identified in South 
Africa and defined by eight mutations in the spike protein 
including (K417N, E484K and N501Y) [8].
Pakistan is currently experiencing a severe third wave of 
infections caused by SARS- CoV- 2, which began in March 
2021. Vaccination rates nationally are under 2 % [9], leaving 
large segments of the community at risk of serious illness 
from COVID- 19. Currently very few SARS- CoV- 2 genomes 
collected in Pakistan are available, with just 12 covering the 
third wave, nine of which are from one city, Islamabad. This 
highlights the need for more genome sequencing from Paki-
stan, particularly given the current situation and the very high 
population in order to allow surveillance of variants in circu-
lation. Currently, more genomes are available in the GISAID 
database for travellers with a travel history from Pakistan, 
than from within the country itself [10].
We have amplicon sequenced 102 samples, randomly 
chosen from a 1 week period in April 2021 from Lahore 
and surrounding areas, to get a snapshot assessment of the 
circulating lineage in the region. This has identified the Alpha 
variant of concern as the primary lineage circulating, found 
in 97.9 % of cases, with clear signals of repeated overseas 
introductions into the region.
METHODS
Genome sequencing and analysis
RNA was extracted using Viral RNA Extraction kit, Favor-
Prep (Cat. No. FAVNK 001–1) and and detection was carried 
out on IQ5five real time PCR using GenomeCoV19 Detection 
Kit by abm (cat: 628) in facility of resource lab for research in 
biomedical sciences and COVID- 19 research lab of University 
of Health Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan.
Positive samples with a CT <25 were randomly selected for 
genome sequencing. Viral RNA was converted in cDNA 
(SuperScript III) and was amplified using the ARTIC protocol 
v3 (LoCost) [11] with sequencing libraries prepared using 
CoronaHiT [12]. We carried out genome sequencing using 
the Illumina NextSeq 500 platform.
The raw reads were demultiplexed using bcl2fastq (v2.20). 
The reads were used to generate a consensus sequence using 
the ARTIC bioinformatic pipeline [13]. Briefly, the reads had 
adapters trimmed with TrimGalore [14] and were aligned to 
the WuhanHu- 1 reference genome (accession MN908947.3) 
using BWA- MEM (v0.7.17) [15]; the ARTIC amplicons were 
trimmed and a consensus built using iVAR (v.1.2.3) [16].
PANGO lineages assigned using Pangolin v2.4.2 and 
PangoLEARN model dated 12 May 2021 [6, 17].
Phylogenetic analysis
For the phylogenetic analysis, all sequences from GISAID 
(available on 14 May 2021) where Pakistan is the country 
of exposure were downloaded and added to the sequences 
from the current study. From these 268 samples, 131 were 
sequenced outside Pakistan, with 110 from the Airport Quar-
antine Station in Japan (travellers from Pakistan sampled at 
arrival) [18]. All remaining sequences from GISAID were 
then compared to this data set where we kept the closest 
ones – for each Pakistan sequence, the four closest from 
non- Pakistan were kept for subsequent analysis to provide 
context. The alignment and neighbour search were done 
with uvaia [19], and problematic (homoplasic or difficult to 
sequence) sites were masked from the alignment [20]. For the 
B.1.1.7 (Alpha) and B.1.351 (Beta) dated phylogenetic infer-
ence, we further enriched each alignment with more distant 
neighbours, which maximized the phylogenetic diversity [21], 
based on the neighbour- joining tree [22] of all sequences 
close to each Pakistan sequence, for each lineage. Sequences 
with more than 10 % N, or with incomplete date information 
were excluded from analysis. Clusters distant and unrelated 
to Pakistan sequences were reduced or removed by visual 
inspection of maximum- likelihood trees.
From the 102 UHS- PAK sequences, 90 samples were included 
in the phylogenetic analysis: 88 from Alpha and 2 samples 
Impact Statement
Genome sequencing of SARS- CoV- 2 helps public health 
scientists to understand the dynamics of the pandemic 
in different parts of the world. Low- and middle- income 
countries have low levels of genomic surveillance, 
depriving them of effective data sources to manage 
their pandemic response and set public health policy. 
We provide a snapshot of samples taken over 1 week 
from Lahore, Pakistan and find that all of the samples 
sequenced were variants of concern, which have either 
increased transmissibility or reduced efficacy against 
vaccines. The 102 samples sequenced represented a fold 
increase in the number of genomes available for Paki-
stan (at the time of sequencing).
3
Sarwar et al., Microbial Genomics 2021;7:000693
from Beta; the final alignments have 723 and 107 sequences, 
respectively. The maximum- likelihood trees were inferred 
with IQTREE2 v2.1.2 [23] with 1000 ultrafast bootstrap repli-
cates [24]. The divergence times were estimated by margin-
alization under a relaxed clock using TreeTime [25] and 
assuming a coalescent prior on three lengths with a constant 
effective population size. Polytomies were resolved by tree-
time when possible by using the time information. Ancestral 
state reconstruction of the country of exposure was done 
under parsimony over the timed tree with castor [26] and 
trees were plotted with ggtree [27], both for R. By weighting 
reconstructed states (countries of exposure) at the internal 
nodes by the number of most parsimonious scenarios, castor 
gives the probability of each node belonging to Pakistan 
or abroad. The number of introductions into Pakistan was 
estimated by counting branches where the reconstructed 
probability of being exposed in Pakistan increased to one. 
Equivalently, the exportations out of Pakistan were given by 
branches with a parental node most probably from Pakistan 
(prob >0.5) and a child node certainly not from Pakistan 
(prob=0). We assume that the date of the event is given by 
the parental node, to discount for ‘importation’ and ‘detection’ 
lags [28], and thus may be biassed since the true transition 
happened somewhere along the branch (i.e. more recent than 
our estimate). For this analysis we excluded the 21 Pakistani 
samples sequenced outside Pakistan, which might have 
been circulating abroad (i.e. except those from the Japanese 
Airport Quarantine Station). Notice that if the parsimony 
assumption fails, e.g. if we expect frequent international 
transmission events hidden along nodes in the tree, then 
this should be modelled under a probabilistic (likelihood or 
Bayesian) approach. Since we included the closest sequences 
from abroad, the reconstruction should not change by adding 
more available data. However, due to unequal sampling and 
sequencing, the number of transitions is an underestimate 
and their dates are subject to selection bias (e.g. previous 
introductions were not sequenced due to regional differences 
or severity of infection).
The distances between all leaf pairs along the maximum- 
likelihood tree were calculated with the package ape for R. 
These so- called patristic (or cophenetic) distances describe 
the path length along all branches separating two samples, and 
by taking the phylogeny into account are a better descriptor of 
the evolutionary differences between the sequences. By multi-
plying the patristic distances by genome length we obtain the 
expected number of SNP differences between samples, since 
branch lengths in a maximum- likelihood tree are given in 
‘expected substitutions per site’.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this study, from 6 April 2021 to 11 April 2021, 102 SARS- 
CoV- 2 samples in viral transport medium (VTM) were randomly 
selected from SARS- CoV- 2 diagnostic positives by the Mayo 
Hospital and Sheikh Zayed Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan. All 
samples had a Ct <25. These public hospitals serve a predomi-
nantly middle- income population. The cases were between 
21 and 91 years of age with a broad distribution of ages, with 
74 % (n=74) male, 26 % (n=26) female and two unknown. Four 
samples were from cases who died (all aged over 60), while all 
others recovered. Cases had no history of international travel, 
with 77 cases explicitly reporting that they and their household 
did not recently travel overseas (Table S1).
Viral RNA was amplified using the ARTIC protocol [11] with 
sequencing libraries prepared using CoronaHiT [12]. Resulting 
sequenced reads were used to generate consensus sequences with 
the ARTIC bioinformatics protocol (see Methods).
Table 1. PANGO lineages of GISAID (as of 2020- 05- 14) data where Pakistan is the country of exposure, with collection dates of first and most recent 
samples
Lineage Count Oldest sample Most recent sample Lineage Count Oldest sample Most recent sample
B.1.1.7 (Alpha) 87 25 December 2020 27 April 2021 B.1.36.22 1 30 November
B.1.351 (Beta) 3 9 April 2021 26 April 2021 C.23 5 11 May 2020 26 November 2020
B.1.617.1 1 26 April 2021 B.1 30 3 May 2020 24 November 2020
C.36 1 26 March 2021 B.1.36.8 1 24 November 2020
B.1.525 1 19 February 2021 B.1.36.24 3 2020- 10- 31 13 November 2020
B.1.1 10 11 May 2020 14 February 2021 B.1.459 1 10 October 2020
B.1.36 35 2 June 2020 9 February 2021 B.1.562 1 10 October 2020
B.1.36.31 17 10 October 2020 23 January 2021 B 3 12 March 2020- 2 July 2020
B.1.36.34 5 9 September 2020 11 January 2021 B.1.260 1 2 July 2020
B.1.1.214 1 6 January 2021 C.11 2 3 June 2020 18 June 2020
B.1.523 1 5 January 2021 B.6 12 16 March 2020 14 June 2020
B.1.1.1 18 3 June 2020 14 December 2020 A 3 2 June 2020 3 June 2020
B.1.471 24 20 May 2020 14 December 2020 B.1.1.370 1 28 May 2020
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Analysis of the PANGO lineages shows that B.1.1.7 (Alpha) 
(first identified in the UK) dominates, accounting for 97.9 % 
(97/99) of cases, with B.1.351 (Beta) (first identified in South 
Africa) accounting for 2.0 % (2/99) of cases. Three further 
samples failed QC, yielding genomes less than 50 % coverage 
of SARS- CoV- 2, and lineages could not be confidently called. 
No other lineages were observed.
SARS- CoV- 2 was first identified in Pakistan on 26 February 
2020 [29]. The first Alpha genome was submitted to GISAID 
on 25 December 2020. There were previously 268 SARS- CoV- 2 
genomes available on GISAID where Pakistan was listed as the 
country of exposure with 90 assigned as Alpha or Beta (Tables 1 
and S1). Most of these samples were associated with international 
travel from the country and were collected outside of Pakistan 
(Table S2). A list of submitting authors of these data can be found 
in Table S3. We combined all Alpha and Beta public data with the 
genomes presented in this study to provide a snapshot of Alpha 
and Beta dissemination (Table S4).
By reconstructing the exposure history over the phyloge-
netic tree, we estimate the number of Alpha importations 
as 112 using the dated tree, as well as 11 exports out of the 
country (Fig. 1). From the histogram at the bottom of Fig. 1, 
Fig. 1. Phylogeny of B.1.1.7 (Alpha) including genomes from Pakistan. At the top, the maximum- likelihood dated tree of lineage B.1.1.7 
(Alpha), showing only samples close to sequences related to Pakistan. Branches are coloured red when all descendant tips have Pakistan 
as the country of exposure. Samples sequenced in the present study are highlighted as red dots. At the bottom we have the histogram 
of introductions into and exportations out of Pakistan over time, as estimated by ancestral state reconstruction. Phylogenetic tree was 
estimated with IQTREE2 followed by divergence times estimation using TreeTime after excluding outliers. The figure was plotted with 
ggtree and introduction events were estimated by ancestral reconstruction under parsimony with the R package castor.
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Fig. 3. Maximum- likelihood dated tree of lineage B.1.351 (Beta) focused on samples sequenced in this study. Branches are coloured 
according to country of exposure, with Pakistan highlighted with a red circle. The two samples from the current study, UHS- PAK- S45 and 
UHS- PAK- S93, are labelled in blue. Phylogenetic tree was estimated with IQTREE2 [23] followed by divergence times estimation using 
TreeTime after excluding outliers. The figure was plotted with ggtree [27].
Fig. 2. Distribution of distances to closest neighbours from Pakistan and abroad, for B.1.1.7 (Alpha) sequences. The number of expected 
substitutions is calculated from the patristic distances between leaves over the maximum- likelihood tree, transformed from substitutions 
per site by multiplying by genome length. For each of the 88 UHS- PAK sequences, we find the closest distance considering only Pakistan 
(blue) or international (red) tips on the tree.
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we observe that the first introduction of Alpha into Pakistan 
may have happened as early as mid October 2020. This is 
after the date of emergence of Alpha in the UK, which has 
been calculated as September 2020 elsewhere [30]. There was 
an increasing number of independent introductions more 
recently, such that most Alpha samples can be traced back to a 
recent ancestor abroad, while a few may have been circulating 
for longer (or belong to unsampled groups).
Genomes from Pakistan were intermingled with genomes from 
elsewhere, as shown in Fig. 2 where we calculated the patristic 
distance of genomes in this study to their closest neighbour and 
found that they were generally closer to samples from abroad, 
i.e. samples without a travel history to Pakistan (see also Fig. S5, 
with the maximum- ikelihood tree). The number of substitu-
tions to the nearest neighbour also varied (0–8 substitutions) 
(Fig. 2). All samples in this study were sourced from cases with 
no travel history. The virus is detected and sequenced from the 
source, usually the UK, where 2 % of the population describe 
their ethnicity as Pakistani [22] and where there are many 
daily direct flights, and then in some cases sampled in Paki-
stan immediately or after several months, where the number 
of substitutions were lower or higher, respectively.
Beta was likely introduced into Pakistan recently. Beta samples 
were found in four clades in the phylogeny of Beta, suggesting 
at least four separate introductions into the country (Fig. 3). 
The time to the most recent common ancestor of Beta globally 
was calculated here as during September 2020, whereas the 
clades containing Beta genomes from Pakistan date no earlier 
than February 2021 (Fig. 3). The date of emergence of Beta 
is before these dates and has been calculated as early August 
2020 elsewhere [8].
It has been demonstrated [31] that vaccines, in particular 
BNT162b2, are effective against Alpha. Therefore, if this 
remains the dominant lineage in the region, public health 
vaccination policy can be implemented accordingly. However, 
whilst the prevalence of Beta, which has been linked to 
lower vaccine efficacy, is very low, this reinforces the need 
for prospective surveillance of SARS- CoV- 2 using genome 
sequencing to inform public health interventions in a 
continual manner.
The most regular source of genomic sequencing is from trav-
ellers from Pakistan being sequenced by their destination 
countries, and being annotated as such in the public databases 
(GISAID). Japan is the largest contributor of genomes from 
travellers originating from Pakistan (111 out of 269). This 
indirect surveillance is useful but unreliable as travel restric-
tions and pre- flight testing can bias the results.
This report shows the critical importance of whole- genome 
sequencing of SARS- CoV- 2 to determine the prevalence and 
changing epidemiology of different variants of the virus. This 
data is crucial to inform public health decision makers as well 
as to allow global epidemiology to be understood. Building 
capacity for sequencing and analysis of genomes in countries 
with high infection rates will be crucial for the global response 
to COVID- 19.
Funding information
The Quadram Institute authors gratefully acknowledge the support of 
the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC); 
their research was funded by the BBSRC Institute Strategic Programme 
Microbes in the Food Chain BB/R012504/1 and its constituent project 
BBS/E/F/000PR10352, also Quadram Institute Bioscience BBSRC 
funded Core Capability Grant (project number BB/CCG1860/1). The 
University of Health Sciences authors acknowledge the support 
provided by the Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan under 
the project RRG- 211.
Conflicts of interest
The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest.
Ethical statement
This project was conducted under approval number UHS/REG- 20/
ERC/1758 from the University of Health Sciences Lahore Ethical 
Review Committee.
References
 1. Sarwar MB, Yasir M, Alikhan N- F, Afzal N, Oliveira Martins L de. 
SARS- cov- 2 variants of concern dominate in lahore, Pakistan in 
april 2021. Figshare. 2021. DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.16553199.v1.
 2. Huang C, Wang Y, Li X, Ren L, Zhao J, et  al. Clinical features of 
patients infected with 2019 novel coronavirus in Wuhan, China. 
Lancet 2020;395:497–506. 
 3. Dong E, Du H, Gardner L. An interactive web- based dashboard to 
track COVID- 19 in real time. Lancet Infect Dis 2020;20:533–534. 
 4. Alm E, Broberg EK, Connor T, Hodcroft EB, Komissarov AB, et al. 
Geographical and temporal distribution of SARS- CoV- 2 clades in 
the WHO European Region, January to June 2020. Euro Surveill 
2020;25:2001410.
 5. Hodcroft EB, Hadfield J, Neher RA, Bedford T. Year- letter Genetic 
Clade Naming for SARS- CoV- 2 on  Nextstrain. org; 2020. https:// 
nextstrain. org/ blog/ 2020- 06- 02- SARSCoV2- clade- naming
 6. Rambaut A. A dynamic nomenclature proposal for SARS- 
CoV- 2 lineages to assist genomic epidemiology. Nat Microbiol 
2020;5:1403–1407. 
 7. Transmission of SARS- COV- 2 lineage b.1.1.7 in England: Insights 
from linking epidemiological and genetic data. medRxiv [Preprint] 
2021. 
 8. Tegally H. Detection of a SARS- CoV- 2 variant of concern in South 
Africa. Nature 2021;592:438–443. 
 9. National Command Operation Center. Pakistan Cases Details; 
2021. https:// covid. gov. pk/ stats/ pakistan
 10. Shu Y, McCauley J. GISAID: Global initiative on sharing all influenza 
data – from vision to reality. Euro Surveill 2017;22:30494. 
 11. Quick J. NCOV- 2019 sequencing protocol v2 v1. protocolsIoBD-
P7I5RN 2020. 
 12. Baker DJ. CoronaHiT: high- throughput sequencing of SARS- CoV- 2 
genomes. Genome Med 2021;13:21. 
 13. Artic network; 2018. https://artic.network/ [accessed 6 July 2020].
 14. Krueger F. Trim Galore. UK: The Babraham Institute, 2020. https:// 
github. com/ FelixKrueger/ TrimGalore
 15. Li H. arXiv:1303.3997. USA: Cornell University, 2013. http:// arxiv. 
org/ abs/ 1303. 3997
 16. Grubaugh ND. An amplicon- based sequencing framework for 
accurately measuring intrahost virus diversity using PrimalSeq 
and iVar. Genome Biol 2019;20:8. 
 17. O’Toole Á. Assignment of epidemiological lineages in an emerging 
pandemic using the pangolin tool. Virus Evol 2021;7:veab064. 
 18. Sekizuka T. COVID- 19 genome surveillance at interna-
tional airport quarantine stations in Japan. J Travel Med 
2021;28:taaa217. 
 19. de Oliveira Martins L. Uvaia. UK: Quadram Institute Bioscience, 
2021. https:// github. com/ quadram- institute- bioscience/ uvaia
 20. Turakhia Y. Stability of SARS- CoV- 2 phylogenies. PLoS Genet 
2020;16:e1009175. 
7
Sarwar et al., Microbial Genomics 2021;7:000693
 21. Minh BQ, Klaere S, von Haeseler A. Phylogenetic diversity within 
seconds. Syst Biol 2006;55:769–773. 
 22. Simonsen M, Pedersen CNS. Rapid computation of distance esti-
mators from nucleotide and amino acid alignments, in proceed-
ings of the 2011 ACM symposium on applied computing - SAC 11. 
the 2011 ACM symposium. In: Proceedings of the ACM Symposium 
on Applied Computing. TaiChung, Taiwan: ACM Press, 2011. p. 89.
 23. Minh BQ. IQ- TREE 2: new models and efficient methods for 
phylogenetic inference in the genomic era. Mol Biol Evol 
2020;37:1530–1534. 
 24. Hoang DT. UFBoot2: Improving the Ultrafast Bootstrap Approxima-
tion. Mol Biol Evol 2018;35:518–522. 
 25. Sagulenko P, Puller V, Neher RA. TreeTime: Maximum- likelihood 
phylodynamic analysis. Virus Evol 2018;4:vex042. 
 26. Louca S, Doebeli M. Efficient comparative phylogenetics on large 
trees. Bioinformatics 2018;34:1053–1055. 
 27. Yu G, Smith DK, Zhu H, Guan Y, Lam T- Y. ggtree: an R package for 
visualization and annotation of phylogenetic trees with their covar-
iates and other associated data. Methods in Ecology and Evolution 
Edited by G McInerny 2017;8:28–36. 
 28. du Plessis L. Establishment and lineage dynamics of the SARS- 
CoV- 2 epidemic in the UK. Science 2021;371:708–712. 
 29. Javed B. Is Pakistan’s response to coronavirus (SARS- CoV- 2) 
adequate to prevent an outbreak? Front Med (Lausanne) 
2020;7:158. 
 30. Galloway SE. Emergence of SARS- CoV- 2 B.1.1.7 Lineage — United 
States, December 29, 2020–January 12, 2021’, MMWR. MMWR Morb 
Mortal Wkly Rep 2021;70:95–99. 
 31. Abu- Raddad LJ, Chemaitelly H, Butt AA, National Study Group for 
COVID- 19 Vaccination. Effectiveness of the BNT162b2 Covid- 19 
Vaccine against the B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 Variants. N Engl J Med 
2021;385:187–189. 
Five reasons to publish your next article with a Microbiology Society journal
1.  The Microbiology Society is a not-for-profit organization.
2.  We offer fast and rigorous peer review – average time to first decision is 4–6 weeks.
3.   Our journals have a global readership with subscriptions held in research institutions around  
the world.
4.  80% of our authors rate our submission process as ‘excellent’ or ‘very good’.
5.  Your article will be published on an interactive journal platform with advanced metrics.
Find out more and submit your article at microbiologyresearch.org.
